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safeguard Romania’s interests in Europe, and he succeeded to promote a clever and intelligent policy so as not to prejudice
the interests of the great European powers of that time. As soon as Antonescu’s regime incorporated Romania into the ‘new order’ established after the victories of the German army and made loyalty to the Axis the guiding principle of the country's foreign policy, Grigore Gafencu abandoned the leading role in the institution, but continued to serve as the extraordinary and plenipotentiary minister of Romania in the Soviet Union, a dignity which he held from the fall of 1940 until June 22, 1941.
His ‘mission’ in Moscow is
still awaiting an assessment, but based on the archive documents known to date,
it can be said that Grigore Gafencu’s nomination was a good choice. Under difficult situations, he managed to protect Romania’s interests with devotion and dignity. However, we consider that, more important than the various actions taken during
his stay in the Russian capital city is the fact that Grigore Gafencu managed to gather the material based on which,
in the second part of the Préliminaires de la Guerre à l'Est, he explained how Romania had become one of Germany’s important allies.
At the end of his mission, although he had accepted
the proposal not to return to Romania and go directly to the UK, Grigore Gafencu declined this offer, wanting to carry out his mission to the end. Like the
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captain who does not abandon his ship and crew in danger, Grigore Gafencu returned to Romania, where he drafted the final report on his diplomatic mission to Moscow for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Once arrived at home, he realised the dilemma of our country at that time:
“A German victory
would mean not only
the oppression of the whole world, but the establishment of continual and natural troubles between the oppressed and the oppressors. A German collapse, on the other hand, may mean not only
a victory for the overseas democracy, but also the triumph of its adversary in Moscow.”
The awareness of Romania’s dramatic situation gave birth to the idea that he should leave the country, not with the purpose of protecting himself, but to continue to serve the national interest.
He chose the neutral Switzerland so that he could not be seen as taking any
of the sides, and from there Grigore Gafencu watched
with extreme caution the dynamics of the events. From the moment he arrived in Switzerland, Grigore Gafencu’s activity was carried out on two levels.
Taking advantage of the peace and quiet offered by the Swiss neutrality, he wrote a masterpiece of historical analysis, Préliminaires de la
guerre à l’Est, a work that we consider to be a masterpiece not only for any historian, but also for any diplomat, any politician. In our opinion, there is no other book in Romanian diplomacy of such depth of analysis as Grigore Gafencu’s work about the German-Soviet conflict. And his approach
was and still is all the more remarkable, as he had no archive documents at the time of drafting the paper. A book that has been 80% confirmed by German and Soviet documents.
At the same time with his journalistic work, Grigore Gafencu took steps to ensure the best possible conditions for Romania at the Peace Conference.
The second plan on which Grigore Gafencu’s activity took place during his exile was the protection of Romania’s interests, especially since
the Romanian politician and diplomat always considered himself a ‘faithful soldier’ on the diplomatic front of Romania, a ‘faithful soldier’ in defending the Romanian national interest.
This second line of work
gave Grigore Gafencu the opportunity to capitalize on
his European dimension, he based his efforts on the idea of promoting and defending the interests of Romania in
a Europe that was deeply
hurt after the war but had to face the Soviet threat. That was the reason why Grigore Gafencu considered Romania’s situation in close relation
to the evolution of Europe.
In his opinion - which today